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From Katanga to.Quebec to the Jura of Switzerland to 
Armenia, new secessionist movements rise to the surface while 
others rejuvenate after a certain period of hibernation. 
Secessionists movements have become a menace to the international 
political order by creating anarchy and conflict. They are 
fueled by a basic human aspiration for self-determination. 
As a phenomenon, secession has been around for centuries. 
However, the post World War Two and post Cold War eras provided 
fertile ground for their growth, as the colonial powers 
arbitrarily carved out non-assimilated people and formed 
artificial sovereign states. 
Several political analysts have been using the terms 
secession and separatism interchangeably. At this point it 
would be wise to differentiate between several political 
phenomena, which all swamp the pure issue of secession. 
Secession is demand for formal withdrawal from a central 
political authority by a member unit on the basis of a claim 
to independent sovereign status (Beran 1984, Heraclides 1992 
and Wood 1981). The aim is to redraw the boundaries instead 
of moving out of the control of the host state. Separatism 
is merely demand for formal autonomy (Heraclides 1992). 
Irredentism refers to formal withdrawal from one state in order 
to join another. Buchanan (1991b, 10) wants to eliminate this 
distinction between secession and its special exception, 
irredentism. However, this distinction is essential as the 
state that wants to accept the minority in question adds 
complexity to the whole dispute. War may be the only solution 
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I 
I as the receiving state may be looking at economic or military 
gains, such as oil fields or mountains suitable for natural 
I 
I defense against the host state (Buchanan 1991b). 
To this date there have been sporadic attempts to categorize 
I  
and analyze past and present secessionist movements in order
 
to predict future attempts. This study attempts to formulate
 
a concise theory on the justifiable reasons for secession, then 
I presents several secessionist movements through a historical 
perspective and finally attempts to critique and categorize
I 
I  
them according to various degrees of legitimacy of secession.
 
A theory of secession should contain several elements.
 
It should include the preconditions of secession, the rise of
 
I secessionist movements and the effectiveness of their actions,
 
the response of central governments, confrontational developments
 
I  
I between the secessionist unit and the host state and finally,
 
resolution of secessionist crises based on certain normative
 
rules (Wood 1981). This essay deals in part with the resolution 
I of the secessionist crises and in particular with their 
legitimacy in the international arena. The theory will attempt 
I 
I to answer an old but fundamental question. How do we as members 
of the international community respond to such claims? When 
is a secessionist movement legitimate? The purpose is ultimately 
I comparative. This framework will give us gUidance. 
Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) have used their 
I power and influence in the past to support certain secessionist 
movements, while crushing others. Therefore, politicalI 
scientists need to start using the same standards to all future 
I 2 
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I 
I secessionist movements. However, providing a list of reasons 
for moral legitimacy of secession will not suffice. A scale 
I 
I has to be established. The more conditions a secessionist 
movement satisfies, the more sound the legitimacy for secession 
will be. However, every secession case needs to be checked 
I individually. Secession has a moral character and it always 
has a right and a wrong.
I It is interesting to note that none of the great 
philosophers of history such as Marx, Mill, Locke, Rousseau,I 
I 
Plato, Hobbes or Hegel have given much thought to the idea of 
secession (Buchanan 1991b and 1992), while the notion of self­
determination has been traced to Aristotle (Kampelman 1993). 
I During the 16th and 17th century Althusius claimed secession 
was possible in order to avoid tyranny and Pufendorf advocated 
I 
I that the ruler had absolute sovereignty and therefore, groups 
could not secede (Beran 1984). A convenient explanation may 
be that they may have never had to face a secession case. A 
I great deal of state disputes were resolved by the military. 
It was not until the American Civil War that political 
I 
I philosophers carne to realize a relatively new phenomenon 
(Buchanan 1992). After all, political divorce from a state 
was unheard of. Nevertheless, a complete and systematic 
I political analysis on secession was still in its infancy. 
A theory on the legitimacy of secessionist movements is 
I 
I desperately needed within the international political arena. 
The media bombards people every day with news of new and 
resurging secessionist movements. The 90s has experienced a 
I 3 
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I 
I rash of uncontrolled nationalism, which may have disastrous 
effect on the international political order (Buchanan 1991b, 
I 
I 2 ) • 
This theory has to be practical first and normative second. 
I 
It will defuse and possibly solve problems of indefinite 
divisibility of minority populations. As long as there are 
major differences between populations, the potential for the
 
I development of secession remains viable. The international
 
community will be able to help stranded or trapped minorities 
I 
I that have become weak politically or militarily. A practical 
theory on the legitimacy of secession may put an end to the 
fear of indefinite divisibility of states (Heraclides 1992) 
I and to the creation of inviable political and economic entities 
(only due to absence of free trade) and thus may prevent the 
I 
I addition of stress to the already strained economic arena. 
It may prevent any damage to the will of the majority or the 
minority by not allowing anyone of the parties to blackmail 
I the other. Finally, it may end inappropriate action taken by 
IGOs and streamline their efforts (Heraclides 1992). 
I 
I Self-determination, diversity and the pursuit of liberty 
place highly on the agenda of liberalism (Buchanan 1991b, 4). 
However, liberalism does not recognize group rights as it relates 
I to secession (Buchanan 1991b, 7), which is inconsistent with 
the notion of accepting freedom as the ultimate political value 
I (Beran 1988). Birch (1984) claims that individuals have the 
right of voice in a democratic state which falls in line with
I self-determination. Nevertheless, secession is attempted by 
I 4 
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I 
I cultural groups when their host state does not include them 
in the decision-making process, as will be shown in the case 
I 
I studies later on. Beran (1988) points out that if individuals 
have the right of voice, then according to liberalism, they 
should automatically have the right to exit. 
I A report by an International Commission of Jurists published 
in 1972 went so far as to suggest that the right of secession 
I can only be exercised once (Kampelman 1993). Birch (1984) also 
claims that once individuals are committed to a state, thatI 
I  
they should have substantial grievances in order to justify
 
their exit. Political association is not unalterable and
 
is created to satisfy the needs of the people that live within 
I it (Buchanan 1991a). The exceptions include the inviability 
of the new state (only due to absence of free trade), 
I 
I exploitation of sub-groups within it, and inability to recognize 
other potential secessionist movements in the future (Beran 
1988). However, Beran (1988) does not permit the secession 
I of an area which is culturally, militarily and economically 
essential to the host state and contains a high share of the 
I 
I economic resources. Beran (1984) writes that Dahl and Tufte 
have shown that there is no relationship between the viability 
of the state and its size, because no one state depends 
I exclusively on a single resource. Therefore, it should not 
be a point of interest whether a secessionist movement wants 
I 
I to abstract a high share of resources or value from the host 
state, as the latter will still survive through trade. 
In the early 1900s, the League of Nations endorsed minority 
I 5 
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I 
I group rights in general, short of secession. Even Woodrow Wilson 
did not endorse secession, except in the case of colonialism 
I 
I (Kampelman 1993). Roosevelt advocated that self-determination 
did not imply fragmentation of a nation (Kampelman 1993). 
A change occurred during the interwar period as Hitler 
I abused his notion of minority rights. He justified his conquests 
of Checkoslovakia and Poland by invoking the rights of German 
I 
I minorities. Therefore, after 1945 the international community 
treated minorities as merely cultural groups without any 
I 
political clout. The United Nations supported national 
self-determination on the one hand, but refused to support any 
secessionist movements in the developed world. Its aim was 
I to end colonialism in the Third World peacefully, mostly because 
the states that emerged from the era of colonialism were 
I 
I arbitrarily carved without any considerations for the ethnic 
groups involved (Buchanan 1991b, 20 and 1992). The U.N. 
Anti-Colonial Declaration of 1960 disapproved of any attempt 
I to fragment the national unity of a state (Heraclides 1992). 
Nevertheless, it has recognized the Former Yugoslav Republic 
I 
I of Macedonia in spite of its earlier claim. Since the advent 
of the Jewish .holocaust, the U.N. has pushed aside its dogma 
on minority rights and has pushed human rights instead (Buchanan 
I 1992). International law recognizes only sovereign states and 
their individuals. It would be violating the principle of 
I 
I non-intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign 
country, thus causing international anarchy (Buchanan 1992). 
Self-determination refers only to the right of a majority 
I 
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I 
I 
I within a political unit to the exercise of power. Any 
association between the right of self-determination and the 
I 
I right of secession by the U.N. would have brought international 
anarchy to the Cold War era, as the US would support one side 
I 
and the Soviet Union the other (Buchanan 1992). States and 
other IGOs have the capacity to act indirectly as intermediaries, 
as in the case of the Tutu and Houtsi in Rwanda. They can act 
I as providers of humanitarian aid, as in the city of Sarajievo 
Bosnia. Lastly, they can take the side of the majority or the
I 
I 
seceding minority group. 
In a democratic framework an individual has the right to 
choose his own government. Beran (1988) points out that liberty 
I is a fundamental political value and that the willingness of 
its citizens should be the only concern to the international 
I 
I community. However, practically this world can only support 
the growth of a finite number of viable sovereign states. What 
criteria should the international community use in order to 
I accommodate the minority group? This theory on the legitimacy 
of secesionist movements does not prevent any cultural group 
I 
I from attempting to secede, but serves to guide the United Nations 
and other IGOs into supporting cultural groups that have a high 
level of legitimacy. Buchanan states (1991b, 21 and 1992) that 
I illegitimate minority groups may potentially seek out milder 
alternatives to secession first, such as limited autonomy, 
I federalism, confederalism. Secession is legitimate only under 
certain circumstances that will be discussed in the theory below.
I 
I 
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I 
I  The Theory
 
First, the legitimacy of a secessionist movement depends 
I upon the presence of a defined territory. Buchanan (1992) states 
that a contiguous majority within the previously definedI 
I 
territory and the application of the Harm Principle, which does 
not allow interference with a group of individuals so long as 
their decisions do not harm others, are desirable elements that 
I increase the legitimacy of the seceding group. Furthermore, 
the seceding group may accommodate the minority within that 
I 
I territory, by buying their property and protecting their 
interests and rights of expression, religion, association, due 
process and participation in political processes in case they 
I decide to remain as citizens of the seceding nations (Buchanan 
1991b, 29-30). Therefore, the existence of a seceding majority 
I 
I within a defined territory increases the legitimacy of that 
group. 
Second, Buchanan (1991b, 32) says that John Stuart Mill 
I has argued that diversity makes a contribution toward social 
utility (Buchanan 1991b, 32). However, the result of the 
I 
I increased level of diversity that the new state brings will 
be realized only through the permeability of its external 
I 
barriers. Foreign trade, intercultural associations and 
membership in international organizations are some factors that 
bring about a change in permeability, thus increasing global 
I diversity. The argument for increased diversity becomes stronger 
when the seceding cultural group has no political representation
I in the host country. Therefore, the increased diversity that 
I 8 
I 
I 
I the seceding group brings to the world increases its legitimacy. 
Third, the original states that formed the union in America 
I  
I .had set some goals. During the Civil War some of the states
 
saw fit to secede from the union because it did not measure
 
up to their expectations. The exit of a seceding group from 
I a state may be possible when the state is no longer able to 
satisfy the original goals and expectations upon which the state 
I was formed. Buchanan (1991b) states that the seceding group 
may be allowed to immigrate or secede with their land especially
I 
I 
if the seceding group was a sovereign state at the time of entry. 
Therefore, the seceding group gains legitimacy when their goals 
and expectations have changed over time. 
I Fourth, Buchanan states that certain states systematically 
draw resources from one group and deposit them with another 
I 
I on purpose (Buchanan 1991b, 40). This unequal treatment creates 
a net flow not only of money but of manpower as well from one 
region of the country to another. In contrast with Buchanan's 
I (1992) suggestion that a transfer from the rich citizens to 
the poor citizens is not an injustice, many other means exist 
I 
I by which a government can increase the standard of living of 
poor areas without transferring resources from the rich to the 
poor. For example the government can transfer technology for 
I new industrial complexes and thus create new jobs in the poor 
areas. It can educate individuals and return them to their 
I homeland to prosper. However, discrimination on the part of 
I the government, or even lack of respect, might accelerate the process of secession. Change occurs when something does not 
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I 
I  function right. The power exercised by the government ends
 
where the unjust exploitation of a certain number of its citizens 
I begins (Buchanan 1991b). Therefore, the seceding group gains 
legitimacy in cases of discriminatory redistribution.I 
I 
Examples of discriminatory redistribution include the Basque 
region in Spain which has been paying three times the percentage 
of state expenditures. The Biafra region in Nigeria contained 
I 22% of the population, contributed 38% of the revenues while 
it received only 14% of the state expenditures. Furthermore, 
I 
I the Katanga region in Congo contributed 50% of the revenues 
while it received only 20% back. Discriminatory redistribution 
occurs on an environmental basis as well as economic. There 
I have been numerous reports from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
which cite high birth defect rates as a result of the 
I 
I concentration of Soviet heavy industry (Buchanan 1991b, 1991a 
and 1992). 
Fifth, history provides evidence of overextented political 
I units swelling to empires. As the empire grows larger it becomes 
unable to cope with the increasing number of problems from the 
I 
I countryside. Therefore, the empire's administrators focus their 
resources and time on the problems of their major cities. 
I 
Therefore, the efficiency of the public administration 
infrastructure declines. Renaissance cities such as Florence 
and Venice were incorporated into greater nation-states because 
I they were too small to protect their trade routes (Buchanan 
1991b, 45-46). Today, small and weak states rely on
I international bodies for their protection (Buchanan 1992). 
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I 
I One of the subordinate reasons the Soviet Union broke up was 
due to decreased efficiency within the seceding states. Mass 
I 
I quantities of grain and other products spoiled in their storage 
bins because they could not reach the big cities in time due 
to transportation deficiencies and inefficient administration. 
I Therefore, the anticipation of increased efficiency of public 
administration by the seceding group increases its legitimacy. 
I 
I Sixth, the United Nations Charter (Article 1 and 55), the 
United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
I 
Cultural Rights and the United Nations International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights proclaim a right for 
self-determination for all people. The key word is people. 
I It refers to groups of individuals that have a common culture, 
religion, shared traditions, language, ethics, customs and above 
I 
I all history. The people form the basis for a nation. These 
factors differentiate the term nation from the political 
boundaries of a country. Unfortunately, there are very few 
I places in the world that are homogeneous. Often, a mixture 
of nations occupy a common area of land. Unlike a sovereign 
I 
I state, the boundaries of a nation are quite fuzzy. With the 
advent of the information superhighway the boundaries become 
even fuzzier, as cultural elements from one nation enter another. 
I For example, are German-Americans living in the US members of 
the German nation? What about the individuals that satisfy 
I 
I some but certainly not all of the features that constitute a 
nation? 
Ethnic identities can be object of political manipulation 
I 1 1 
I 
I 
I (Wood 1981). In F.Y.R.O.M. (Macedonia), for example, the 
Yugoslav leader Tito forged a nation called Macedonia to serve 
I his political ambitions of keeping Macedonia as a state within 
I  the Yugoslav federation. Several groups consisting of Greeks,
 Bulgarians and Albanians had developed irredentist views after
 
I the second World War aspiring to join their respective nations.
 
Therefore, the existence of features of primordial nationalism
 
I within a seceding group increases their legitimacy.
 
Seventh, a cultural group may vie for secession if they
I 
I 
feel that their culture is truly threatened from extinction. 
A culture's value is determined by its contribution to the lives 
of the people who live by it and by the people who indirectly 
I come into contact with it (Buchanan 1991b, 52). However, a 
culture may only be saved when the individuals within that 
I 
I culture want it saved and when it is beyond their capacity to 
act. Examples include, the Armenians of Turkey which have been 
systematically slaughtered and the French-speaking citizens 
I of Quebec which are assimilated by the English-speaking Canadians 
(Buchanan 1991b, 55). Once secession is successful the new 
I 
I constitution can warrant a right of exit in the future for 
various ethnic groups living within it by providing difficult 
but surmountable barriers (Buchanan 1992). The region can 
I be allowed to secede only if the vast majority decides that 
it is wise to do so (Birch 1984). An important factor in the 
I 
I decision is the presence of a distinctive economic interest 
(Hechter 1992). An exception to the rule would be cultures 
that are so violent and anti-human that should not warrant 
I 12 
I 
I 
I preservation, such as the Nazis (Buchanan 1991b). Therefore, 
the preservation of a distinct culture by a seceding group, 
I 
I when other alternatives to secession are not available, increases 
its legitimacy. 
Eight, many times the majority within the host state or 
I a second sovereign state act aggressively toward the minority 
group and threaten to exterminate it. The host state may not 
I 
I be willing to apply any defensive measures in order to stop 
the aggression. Therefore, the minority group wants to secede 
in order to prepare its own defense against the aggressor by 
I strenghtening its economic and military status, by asking for 
aid from other states and IGOs (Buchanan 1991b, 65). An 
I excellent example is the case of the people of Armenia that 
inhabit parts of Turkey, Iraq, Syria. Two weeks ago the Turkish
I 
I 
army invaded the northern province of Iraq in order to 
exterminate certain leaders of the Armenian Liberation Army. 
Iraq does not think highly of the Armenian people and does not 
I want to oppose the Turkish invasion. Therefore, the Armenians 
want to secede from all three states and form their own sovereign 
I 
I state. Therefore, the anticipation of threat from an external 
to the seceding group source increases the legitimacy of that 
group to secede in order to defend itself from the aggression. 
I Nine, the minority group may have been a sovereign state 
until the time it was unjustly annexed by another state. 
I 
I Buchanan (1991b) points out that the secession is simply the 
reappropriation of stolen property by the rightful owner. This 
statement begs the question of who is the rightful owner. The 
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I 
I Soviet Union annexed the three Baltic Republics of Latvia,
 
Estonia and Lithuania during World War two. In 1991 the three
 
I  
I republics declared their claim to secession by arguing that
 
the territory was unjustly taken by the Soviets. However, how
 
old does the claim to ownership have to be in order to be valid?
 
I The claim of the Baltic Soviet Republic was valid for two
 
reasons. First they were annexed as a result of a unilateral
 
I  
I declaration of war and second they existed as sovereign states
 
before the annexation trying to do everything in their power
 
to avoid the conflict. Therefore, the legitimacy of the seceding
 
I group increases when it claims to reappropriate stollen property
 
or territory.
 
I Finally, the theory of liberalism proclaims that each people
 
has the right of self-determination. The number of nations
I 
I 
occupying this Earth is large. Practically, the number of 
potential nations far exceeds the number of viable states, even 
though there is no direct relationship between the viability 
I of a state and its size. The wealthy states that are small 
in size became wealthy before they were reduced in size. the 
I 
I opposite may not be true. The United Nations is flooded with 
applications for financial aid to Third World countries. U.N. 
resources have been stretched to the limit after the humanitarian 
I aid missions to Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Therefore, the 
international community has to look into the survivability of 
I 
I these aspiring and emerging secessionist movements. Nationalism 
is on the rise as new cultural groups learn from the mistakes 
of the old ones. The ease of success of secessionist movements 
I 14 
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I 
I  in the former Soviet Union has provided the spark for the
 
emergence of new groups. Issues that were previously not 
I discussed within the framework of the seceding group now receive 
the center of attention. Some may want to refer to Monaco orI 
I 
Cyprus which have a population of less than a million. 
Nevertheless, these countries had a strong and relatively 
homogeneous society as well as a powerful economy. Therefore, 
I the legitimacy of the seceding group increases when it is wealthy 
and/or favors free trade
I 
I 
Before examining the legitimacy of claims to secessionist 
self-determination, I must examine some basic facts with respect 
to the history and development of the different secessionist 
I movements worldwide. After each case study, the secessionist 
movement rated according to the aforementioned theory. However, 
I 
I there are two traps with such an approach. First, most political 
scientists advocate secession only under certain conditions 
mentioned in their theories. Secession is not a privilege but 
I a right (McGee 1992). When a group has the right to secede, 
the theory provides a measure of the level of legitimacy present 
I 
I in that society. Second, when a group satisfies only a fraction 
of the criteria its legitimacy to secede is lessened? Many 
I 
people die on the altar of secession trying to exercise their 
right. A lot of money are spent to advance a secessionist cause. 
These are some of the reasons why I say that this theory 
I determines the legitimacy of secessionist movements. 
The case studies examined are the Katanga secession of
I Congo, the Naga secession of India, the Kurd secession of Iraq, 
I 15 
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I 
I Syria, Turkey and U.S.S.R., the Bangladesh secession of Pakistan, 
the Biafra secession of Nigeria, the Eritrea secession of 
I Ethiopia, the Equatorian secession of South Sudan and the Quebec 
I secession of Canada. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I CASE STUDIES 
The Katanga Secession of Congo 
I 
I Congo was the second-largest country in Africa on June 
30 1960, at the time of its independence. Katanga, its 
southeastern province, declared its independence on July 11. 
I Out of all the African states that gained their independence 
Congo was the least prepared state. It was a meltingpot of 
I 
I about 150 ethnic groups that spoke forty languages. The three 
largest ethnic groups were the Baluba, the Lunda and the Bayeke. 
Since Katanga was the richest province of Congo, it was swamped 
I with immigrants from the neighboring province of Kasai 
(Heraclides, 1991). 
I The secessionist party called Conakat formed in 1958 as 
a reaction to the influx of poor immigrants, who amounted to
I 
I 
38% of the population. The recruitment of the immigrants by 
the mining companies, falling copper prices and the increasing 
political activity of the immigrants all resulted in the 
I formation of Conakat. Its purpose was the establishment of 
a sovereign state that would be governed only by the Katangese. 
I 
I However, the viability of Congo lay in the copper minefields 
of Katanga. The public sentiment favored full secession while 
some of its leaders favored separatism. The secessionist 
I movement died out in 1963 after the deterioration of relations 
between the Katangese leaders and Belgium. Furthermore, the 
I 
I U.N.-US diplomatic offensive isolated the province economically 
and politically, which led to the downfall of the Katanga regime. 
Kennedy's administration advocated that Congo would not be viable 
I 17 
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I 
I without the province of Katanga and would thus fall in the hands 
of the Communists (Heraclides, 1991). 
I 
I The Katangese legitimized their secession with arguments 
of violent atrocities by the host government, of legitimate 
authority to rule their own homeland (based on election results), 
I of refusals by the host government to compromise and of the 
economic benefits to the rest of the states of Central Africa 
I 
I (Heraclides, 1991). 
The Biafra Secession of Nigeria 
Nigeria became independent in October 1960. Seven years 
I later and after two coup attempts the Eastern region of Nigeria 
seceded calling itself the Republic of Biafra. Nigeria, like 
I 
I Congo, was highly heterogeneous and consisted of more than 400 
ethnic groups. The rbo group comprised about 64% of the Eastern 
I  
region and were educated, economically affluent and held many
 
government positions. The Northern region remained the most
 
dominant group until 1966, when a military group belonging to 
I the rbo group organized a coup. The rbo of the Eastern region 
remained in power for a year, until the Northern region organized 
I 
I their own coup and regained control. That coup lay the 
foundation for the ensuing secessionist movement in the Eastern 
region known as Biafra. Massacres and atrocities ensued for 
I two years (until 1968), which brought about a million refugees 
to the Eastern region. The rest of Nigeria wanted a tight 
I 
I federation, but the Easterners desired to achieve sovereignty. 
Neither side was capable militarily of action. Therefore, each 
side attempted to penetrate the international system but with 
I 18 
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I  
I limited success. Biafra fought well on the battlefield as well
 
as the diplomatic table, with help from the Nixon administration
 
and French arms (Heraclides 1991).
 
I The arguments for the legitimacy of secession on the side
 
of Biafra were the pre-war massacres, the reluctance of the
 
I  
I Nigerian state to accept any other compromise except surrender,
 
the use of a land and marine blockade to starve the population,
 
I  
the bombing of civilians and the cultural threat from the rest
 
of Nigeria (Heraclides 1991).
 
The Southern Sudan Secession
 
I Sudan became independent on January 1 1956. 40% of the
 
population was Arab even though they were concentrated in the 
I  
I north. From 1930 on, the southern province of Equatoria was
 
treated separately from the northern by the English, so that
 
the Africans would not be subject to Arab culturalism and could 
I therefore develop a line of their own. Southern Sudan became 
a distinct entity both in their minds as well as in the minds 
I 
I of foreigners as a result of British policy. The Southerners 
were African, black, underdeveloped, poor, rural and Christian, 
while the Northerners were white, Arab, rich and Muslims. The 
I infrastructure of the government lay mostly in the hands of 
the Sudanese Arabs. From 1947 until a few months prior to 
I  
I Sudan's independence the Sudanese Africans pressed for a
 
federation or autonomy in order to rid themselves of the
 
I 
second-class citizenship. The Southerners tried to remedy the 
situation by democratic means and were very close to obtaining 
their goals by 1958. However, a military coup by the North 
I 
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I  
I 
I vanished any hopes that the South might have of gaining some 
political clout. By 1960 the Southerners resorted to an armed 
I struggle. Nevertheless, the Southerners could not mount the 
same kind of international activity as the Biafrans or the 
I 
I Katangans, as the oil reserves were not discovered until 1979. 
By 1968 they wanted full sovereignty. Soviet and radical Arab 
involvement in the crisis was increasing. The CIA and Israel 
I became involved in the mid-sixties but the war and the 
secessionist movement ended in 1972 as it was forgotten in the 
I 
I West. Finally, no IGOs were directly involved in the conflict 
(Heraclides 1991). 
The arguments for the legitimacy of the South Sudanese 
I secessionist movement were mainly black nationalism, 
self-determination, extreme inequality (politically and 
I 
I economically), threat of assimilation by the Arabs, reluctance 
on the part of the Arabs to even consider the Southern Sudaneses' 
I 
claims to autonomy or federalism and violent atrocities. 
However, there was still some concern over the viability of 
the aspiring state and inter-ethnic conflicts.
 
I The Kurdistan Secession
 
Kurdistan is a nation divided between Syria, Iraq, Iran, 
I 
I the Soviet Union and Turkey, as a result of the arbitrary carving 
of states from the former Ottoman Empire after World War two. 
The Kurdish have lived in the same vicinity since the Persian 
I Empire two thousand years ago. However, it has assimilated 
itself into a nation only from the turn of the century, even 
I though it was internationally recognized as a minority group 
I 20 
I  
I 
I before the formation of Iraq. The treaty of Sevres in 1922,
 
which provided autonomy to the Kurds, was replaced by the new
 
I  
I treaty of Lausanne in 1923. On January 22 1946 the Kurds of
 
Iran declared their independence, which lasted for a year until
 
it was crushed by the Shah of Iran. During the 60s and the
 
I 70s the Kurds held fundraisers for promotional purposes in
 
Lausanne, but could not sustain international interest. However,
 
I  
I their goal was vague. Some of the leaders wanted autonomy,
 
others tight or loose federation and others wanted a
 
confederation.
 
I The Bangladesh Secession of Pakistan
 
Pakistan became independent in 1947 when it was part of
 
I  
I India. This action separated the Muslims from the Hindus.
 
It is difficult to carry out an analysis on this conflict based
 
I  
on religion. It is also necessary to carry out an analysis
 
of the social and cultural factors imposed by the British rule
 
(Heraclides 1991 and Kumar 1990).
 
I There were two wings in Pakistan at the time of its
 
formation. They split in 1971 because the West Pakistanis and 
I 
I the Eastern Pakistanis had linguistic (very few East Pakistanis 
could speak Urdu, the official language of Pakistan), cultural 
and social differences. Communication and transportation 
I problems ensued as soon as Pakistan was formed due to the great 
distance that spans between them. East and West Pakistan were 
I  
I never one nation, as they had no common history, no common
 
consciousness or ethnicity (Heraclides 1991). In fact, the
 
first signs of nationalism were present in the 1830s (Soumitra 
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I 1992). The Pakistani leaders wanted to forge a nation 
(Heraclides 1991). East Pakistan was relatively homogeneous, 
I 
I while West Pakistan was trying to unify its four ethnic groups 
(Burcheit 1978). Economic conditions for the East Pakistanis 
went from bad to worse, as a result of extreme corruption 
I (Heraclides 1991 and Burcheit 1978). In 1966 the East Pakistanis 
proposed a system of loose federation. The election system 
I 
I changed to one-man one-vote in 1970, which gave an overwhelming 
majority to East Pakistan in the legislature. The East 
I 
Pakistanis started to strengthen their military. In 1971 they 
wanted nothing short of complete independence. The West 
Pakistani Army occupied Bangladesh (East Bengal before 1946) 
I during that year. The Pakistani Air Force attacked India's 
airfields and started a war on December 4 1971, which ended
I 
I 
with Bangladesh's independence days later (Heraclides 1991). 
Bangladesh's main arguments for legitimacy of their 
secessionist movement was self-determination, atrocities during 
I the late 60s, linguistic, cultural differences, discriminatory 
redistribution (as evident from the per capita income difference 
I 
I between West and East Pakistan), absence of any historical or 
ethnic ties (Heraclides 1991). The main motive for secession 
in East Pakistan has been associated with socio-economic factors 
I such as the contradictions between big traders and the poor. 
These factors were largely ignored by India and the rest of 
I the world (Kumar 1990). Therefore, the majority of states in 
I the U.N. voted against the secession (Heraclides 1991 l. The Eritrean Secession of Ethiopia 
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I Ethiopia is the only African country that has not been 
colonized by the West. The Italians tried to colonize the region 
I 
I in the late 30s, but were beaten in the battle of Adowa. The 
government remained autocratic until 1974 when the king Selassie 
I 
was deposed. Eritrea was a region on the northeast boundaries 
of Ethiopia effectively blocking Ethiopia's access to the Red 
Sea. At the time of annexation the population of Eritrea 
I numbered four million, which was about 10% of the total Ethiopian 
population with the land percentage being about the same. The 
I 
I population living in Eritrea was fairly homogeneous comprised 
of an equal number of Muslims and Tigrinyans (Heraclides 1991). 
The Soviet Union advocated self-determination in the form of 
I full sovereignty, while the US favored the king's position of 
a loose federation. Therefore, the U.N. established a federation 
I 
I with Ethiopia and Eritrea as its two federated states in 1950. 
However, there were sporadic arguments for secession from the 
late 40s. Their targets for political support included 
I neighboring African states such as Egypt, Libya, Somalia, as 
well as the US and Israel. However, in 1976 the Eritreans 
I 
I switched to the Soviet camp and received support only from 
conservative African states. During the 60s Ethiopia succeeded 
in annexing the Eritrean region and reducing its Assembly to 
I a powerless entity. The armed struggle of the Eritreans started 
in 1961 as a result of the annexation and continues currently 
I (Heraclides 1991). 
The Eritrean arguments for the legitimacy of their
I secessionist movement include self-determination, atrocities 
I 23 
I 
I 
I from the king, oppression, black colonialism, the abolishment
 
of the freedom to assemble, to free speech, free elections to
 
I  
I the point of suspension of the Eritrean constitution (Heraclides
 
1991).
 
The Naga Secession of India
 
I The Naga are situated in the northeast region of India.
 
They reside in a highly heterogeneous part of India. The Naga 
I 
I are Mongolian in origin and retain a distinct cultural 
background. They are divided into 14 tribes with some linguistic 
differences. From the time of the British occupation on through 
I the Indian independence they were treated differently and 
isolated, effectively becoming second-class citizens. In 1947 
I 
I the Naga opted for autonomy with an option to secede in ten 
years. Therefore, in 1956 they requested full independence 
I 
but were denied by the Indian government. Many riots ensued 
(Bucheit 1978). 
However, the political situation changed in 1962 when the 
I Indian government changed its stance and its constitution in 
order to calm down the riots. In 1963 India declared that the 
I  
I Nagaland was given the full rights of statehood within India.
 
The Naga were not satisfied and again declared full independence.
 
They explained that their territory was never conquered by the
 
I Indian Army, but was forced into a union with India by the
 
British. They subsequently turned down a plea of autonomy from
 
I  
I India, but accepted a cease-fire which lasted from 1964 to 1972.
 
However, by 1967 they were receiving support from Pakistan and
 
China. The successful secession of Bangladesh diverted troops 
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I to Nagaland and the Naga themselves could not use Bangladesh 
as their guerrilla battlefield. Therefore, from 1971 on their 
I 
I military power was minimized and subsequently put down in 1975. 
The secessionist leaders were given amnesty. The result was 
that Nagaland remained a state within India. Many Naga saw 
I this as a favorable turnout of the conflict, as they gained 
their cultural autonomy. Secession may not have been a perfect 
I 
I idea anymore, since Nagaland would not have survived politically 
and economically (Bucheit 1978). 
I 
The arguments for the legitimacy of the Nagaland 
secessionist movement were self-determination, atrocities by 
undisciplined Indian troops. Nevertheless, their population
 
I was not homogeneous and the Naga leaders could not prove that
 
their cause was supported by a majority of the population 
I 
I (Bucheit 1978).
 
The Quebec Secession of Canada
 
Canada is a heterogeneous confederate country with a 
I population of about 23 million, two-thirds of which speak 
English. The rest speak French and reside within the boundaries 
I 
I of Quebec, comprising about 80% of the state's population. 
Their economy and culture is largely dominated by the 
Anglo-Canadians. Therefore, most Franco-Canadians were 
I dissatisfied with the present situation. Since the 50s Franco­
Canadians's numbers and income seem to declining, while the 
I 
I unemployment rate has risen (Flowers 1984). 
Bilingualism started in 1867 when the French were defeated 
by the British and resulted in a federated country. From then 
I 
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I 
I on Canada accepted this dispersed nationalism and slowly began 
to change from an agrarian society to a structure of urban 
I  
I and industrial megalopolis. By 1960 the Francophones started
 
to implement a plan to raise their income and status. During
 
the 60s and early 70s a blossom of new secessionist parties 
I and terrorist organizations promoted an independent Quebec. 
The general population, however, was not too keen on 
I 
I independence. Its major ally has been France. Presidents De 
Gaulle and Giscard d'Estaing overtly gave support for a free 
Quebec, while reaping personal benefits from their speeches 
I in upcoming elections. In 1980 there was a referendum posed 
by Parti Quebecois, the ruling party since 1976, which opted 
I 
I for sovereignty of Quebec. However, most of the French 
population said no to independence. From then on Quebec tried 
I 
to muster internal support for its cause instead of seeking 
international recognition. Nationalism was difficult to exploit, 
non-radical and non-violent. The case of Quebec has shown that 
I even though international organizations fail to recognize 
secessionist movements as wholes they may recognize ethnic groups
I seeking only autonomy. 
I 
SUMMARY 
I Examining the case studies I sought to find out how they 
fit the theory on the legitimacy of secession. First, the 
I 
I secessionist movements of Katanga, Sudan, Bangladesh and Eritrea 
had a defined territorial base. They defined their territory 
through the use of the host state's external borders and 
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I administrative internal subdivisions. The remaining four had 
a territory defined culturally. The defined territory enveloped 
I 
I members of the ethnic group arbitrarily, transgressing borders 
of sovereign states. 
Second, the secessionist movements of Sudan, Kurdistan, 
I Bangladesh and Eritrea brought about an increase in global 
diversity. They were unique culturally and historically. The 
I 
I remaining movements had citizens in neighboring countries which 
did not want to become part of the secession. The Katangese 
ethnic groups could be found in the rest of Congo, while there 
I was a small amount of white colonialists. The Ibo citizens 
of Biafra could be found in the rest of Nigeria, while the Naga 
I were basically Indians that evolved to adapt to the Himalayas. 
The Franco-phones of Quebec are nothing more than CanadiansI 
I 
speaking French. A similar culture can be found in the rest 
of Canada and France. 
Third, the secessionist movements in Biafra, Sudan,
 
I Kurdistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea and Nagaland observed changes
 
in their original goals and aspirations of the host state after 
I 
I its formation. Most of the aforementioned ethnic groups were 
forced to join the arbitrarily carved post-colonial states. 
The Katangese secession could not have been due to these changes 
I as independence was sought days after the independence of Congo. 
The secession of Quebec also could not be attributed to these 
I 
I changes, as it has its own legislature and enjoys partial 
autonomy in a federal system. 
Fourth, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Biafra, 
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I Sudan, Kurdistan, Bangladesh and Eritrea were victims of
 
discriminatory redistribution. Resources were systematically
 
I  
I drawn out of these regions and invested in the rest of the host
 
state. The Naga were nomads and could not be asssesed any taxes.
 
Furthermore, resources were scarse in the Himalayas. In the
 
I case of Quebec the majority of the taxes stayed within the state
 
of Quebec, while the other regions of Quebec enjoyed the same
 
I  
I standard of living.
 
Fifth, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Bangladesh,
 
Eritrea and Nagaland sought an increase in the efficiency of
 
I their public administration infrastructure. In most cases the
 
host states were either too large to assume the basic
 
I responsibilities of a state efficiently or too underdeveloped
 
to support the seceding region. In the extreme case of
I 
I  
Bangladesh, the host country Pakistan was thousand of miles
 
away. Biafra's and Quebec's administrative structures were
 
at the same level of development as in the rest of Nigeria and 
I Canada respectively. 
Sixth, the secessionist movements in Sudan, Kurdistan, 
I 
I Bangladesh, Eritrea and Quebec were fueled by primordial 
nationalism. They were homogenious and compact. The Katangese 
secession was supported by 150 different ethnic groups, while 
I the Biafran by more than 400 and the Naga by about 14. 
Seventh, the secessionist movements in Sudan, Kurdistan, 
I 
I Bangladesh, Eritrea and Quebec aimed at the preservation of 
a distinct culture. Some features that can be attributed to 
a distinct culture include common language, tradition, history 
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I and religion. Again. the movements in Katanga, Biafra and
 
Nagaland were too heterogenious to constitute a distinct culture.
 
I  
I Eighth, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Biafra,
 
Sudan, Kurdistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea and Nagaland anticipated
 
external threat either from the host state or from a third state.
 
I Most of the movements were characterized by numerous deaths
 
of supporters. The only movement that has not anticipated any
 
I  
I form of physical threat is the one in Quebec.
 
Ninth, the secessionist movements in Sudan and Kurdistan
 
were victims of rectificatory injustice. Sudan was taken by
 
I the Arabs and slowly assimilated, while Kurdistan was dismembered
 
by Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The rest of the movements had
 
I  
I cultural control over their land but not political.
 
Finally, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Biafra,
 
I  
Sudan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, and Quebec are considered to be
 
viable in case secession is successful. The subjective decision
 
is based 
I natural 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
on their overall economic situation, the presence of 
resources and their prospects for free trade. 
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I 
I Figure 1 summarizes the results.
 
Points of Theory Kat. Bfr. Sud. Kur. Ban. Eri. Nag. Qbc.
 
I  
I 1.Territory Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No
 
2.Incr. in diversity No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
 
3.Changed goals No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
 
I 4.Discrim. Redistr. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
 
5.Incr. in effie. Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes No
 
I  
I 6.Primord. national. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
 
7.Cultural preserv. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
 
8.Anticip. of threat Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
 
I 9.Rectif. injustice No No Yes Yes No No No No
 
10.Viability/Trade Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
 
I Total # of Yes 5/10 4/10 9/10 7/10 9/10 9/10 3/10 3/10
 
I 
I 
Summing up the results from the examination of case studies 
I observe that the theory holds true. There are four nations 
that have scored high, meaning they have a high degree of 
I legitimacy with their people and may still be holding strong. 
First, there is one nation that has already seceded, Bangladesh, 
I  
I which places highly on the legitimacy scale with a relative
 
score of 9/10. Other nations that are very likely to secede
 
are the Sudanese-Africans (9/10), the Kurds (7/10) and the 
I Eritreans (9/10). Second, there have been four nations that 
have either compromised with their host state or died out due 
I 
I to low support They are the Katangese (5/10), the Biafrans 
(4/10), the Naga (3/10) and the Quebecois (3/10). It is 
interesting to note that the last two nations are the ones that 
I 
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I 
I have either compromised to autonomy or federal status and have 
scored the lowest of them all. Therefore, it is my opinion 
I 
I that this theory fits the framework of international secessionist 
movements and should be used to measure their legitimacy or 
degree of solidarity. In a normative and liberal framework 
I every secessionist movement succeeds. However, this theory 
is more practical than normative. 
I 
I The secessionist movements with high levels of legitimacy 
(more than 5/10) are more likely to be supported by the United 
Nations and the IGOs and thus succeed, whereas the ones with 
I low levels of legitimacy (less than 5/10) are more likely to 
compromise. Buchanan (1991b) points out that the right to 
I self-determination is vague and does not necessarily mean 
sovereignty. Low legitimacy secessionist movements may be 
I 
I encouraged to try other forms of self-determination, such as 
autonomy, federalism, confederalism. In a democratic state 
political power is divided evenly among the members of the state. 
I Other possible solutions for low legitimacy secessionist 
movements include the acceptance of special rights within the 
I 
I host state accorded only to members of the seceding group, such 
as a guaranteed number of seats in the legislature irrespective 
of their population percentage. The host state may implement 
I longer residency requirements so as not to change the population 
demographics within the seceding region. It can accord special 
I 
I group property rights to members of the seceding group to 
discourage non-members from acquiring land within the seceding 
region. All these measures can be implemented instead of 
I 
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I 
I secession, which can satisfy the requirements of both the host 
state and the seceding group.
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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